



Washington, D.C. 20505

28 March 2019

Ms. Emma Best
MuckRock News
DEPT MR 53556
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144

Reference: F-2018-01655

Dear Ms. Best:

This is a final response your 12 May 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for **a copy of Clandestine Services Historical Series #98, The Illegal Border Crossing Program, 1946-1959**. We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located one document, consisting of six pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). A copy of the document and an explanation of exemptions are enclosed. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact us at:

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Information and Privacy Coordinator
703-613-3007 (Fax)

Please be advised that you may seek dispute resolution services from the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) of the National Archives and Records Administration. OGIS offers mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies. You may reach CIA's FOIA Public Liaison at:

703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline)

The contact information for OGIS is:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001
202-741-5770
877-864-6448
202-741-5769 (fax)
ogis@nara.gov

Contacting the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Riggs Monfort". The signature is stylized with a large initial "R" and "M".

Riggs Monfort
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Explanation of Exemptions

Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter-and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
- (b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or, in the case of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source ; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical safety;
- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

April 2012

Secret*CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by DDP*

CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Clandestine Service Historical Series

THE ILLEGAL BORDER-CROSSING
PROGRAM

1946 - 1959

Secret

CS HP 098
Controlled by: SB
July 1971

Copy 2 of 2

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based personnel during 1947 and 1948.

The Ryabov Case

Of interest, however, is one case which apparently had no CI ramifications, and which was a harbinger of the path Soviet operations were to take a decade and more in the future. This involved a Soviet political officer with the rank of major and the putative name of Vasiliy Nikolayevich Ryabov, and his German girl friend.* Ryabov had been wounded in 1945 during the Soviet capture of Berlin and had been brought back to health by a German nurse, who later became his girl friend. In 1947 Ryabov was stationed in Dresden. His girl friend resided in West Berlin, where information on her attachment to the Soviet major came to the attention of Captain Alexander Sogolow, an S-2 officer in liaison with CIA's Berlin Base. George Belic of the Berlin Base was thereupon put in contact

* Data on this case derive primarily from personal interviews with case officers who were directly involved. The writer was unable to verify whether Ryabov was the major's true name, nor was he able to establish the nurse's identity. A thorough search of various CS document repositories failed to unearth operational files, personality dossiers, or other vital data on this case. Neither RID/201, RID/Cryptic Reference, nor CI Staff was able to provide meaningful information. A 201 file allegedly associated with CARAVAN in fact refers to a person who has no connection with the case.

- 16 -

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with Ryabov and the nurse, and from October 1947 to December 1949 Ryabov acted as the principal agent in the CARAVAN operation, which for a time also carried the designation DODGE. In 1948 the case was taken over in Berlin by Boleslav A. Holtsman. The German girl acted as courier between the major in Dresden and the Americans in West Berlin. Ryabov had immediate family members in Moscow, and he was unwilling to opt for an outright defection because of the penalties his relatives would undergo if he fled. His reporting on Soviet order of battle and on Soviet intentions during the height of the Berlin Blockade in 1948 was judged of outstanding value. Operational planning included the staging of an accident complete with a corpse from the Berlin morgue provided with documents alleging that the body was that of Major Ryabov. CIA operational capabilities in the Soviet Zone of Germany were limited, however, and in December 1949 Ryabov was transferred to Moscow for a tour of duty with the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Prior to his departure, Ryabov was briefed on plans to aid in his future exfiltration via Finland or Iran. Although CIA obtained word of his safe arrival in Moscow, the Agency was unable to

- 17 -

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maintain a viable means of communication with an agent in the Soviet capital and contact with the officer was lost. The German girl friend was evacuated by CIA to West Germany. ^{11/}

The Shift to Munich

By 1948 Munich, the capital of Bavaria, which was entirely within the American Zone of Occupation, became the main center of operational activity against the Soviet target. Two factors contributed greatly to this development. Munich, unlike Berlin and Vienna, was deep within the American Zone and therefore unencumbered with confrontations and juridical disputes with the Soviet forces, who had no access or authority in the American Zone. Secondly, most displaced persons from the USSR were concentrated in the American Zone and established their political, welfare, and cultural centers in the Bavarian capital. New escapees from Eastern Europe, such as the wave of Czechs and Slovaks who fled from their homeland after the February 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, tended to gravitate toward Bavaria. Thus the Strategic Services Unit (SSU)-CIG base in Munich early in the post-war years was obliged by circumstances to keep abreast of Soviet

- 18 -

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organize an Assessment and Recruitment Section within CSOB, Munich, to specialize in these matters.

The Assessment and Recruitment Section of CSOB was organized in March 1952 with Sogolow as chief [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Sogolow was also assigned liaison and coordination duties with the ZRELOPE paramilitary agent recruitment program which was eventually placed under the Assessment and Recruitment Section of CSOB for the spotting, assessing, and recruiting of all ZRELOPE USSR agent candidates. ^{32/}

3. Recruitment

The recruitment of REDSOX agents of Soviet nationality almost always was based on their ideological opposition to the Bolshevik dictatorship. In the case of Soviet minority nationals such as the Ukrainians, Balts, and Armenians, the ideological motivating factor was that of opposition to Soviet Russian imperialism and the possible liberation of their homelands. Financial remuneration played the dominant role only with strictly mercenary agents who undertook to perform a REDSOX mission in return for a fixed fee. The border-crossing missions undertaken on CIA's behalf by certain

- 50 -

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[redacted] nationals are an example of the strictly cash-for-services-rendered arrangement. Financial considerations were also the primary motivations of the

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(b)(3)

[redacted] air crews who undertook "black" flights into the USSR on REDSOX agent-drop missions.*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Upon completion of the assessment package and receipt of appropriate operational security clearance, the recruitment "ceremony" usually included the signing of a secrecy agreement and a contractual obligation on the part of the Agency to establish a savings fund in which the agent's salary and any bonuses would be held in escrow pending the completion of his mission. The Agency's name was never used in the recruitment of REDSOX agents. Agreements were usually made with the US Government, the Department of Defense, or the US Army. Undoubtedly, however, many agents guessed or deduced that they were dealing with CIA.

In cases of REDSOX agents provided by the anti-Soviet emigre groups, recruitment for penetration missions was done by the emigre group concerned and a

* Ironically, these mercenaries were virtually the only ones to survive their missions. See Att. B.

- 51 -

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